The Security of “2FLIP” Authentication Scheme for VANETs: Attacks and Rectifications

Wireless broadcast transmission enables Inter-vehicle or Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication among nearby vehicles and with fixed equipment, referred to as Road Side Units (RSUs). The RSUs within range establish a self-organizing network called Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET). V2V in VANETs is vulnerable cyber-attacks involving message manipulation. Thus, mechanisms should be applied ensure both the authenticity integrity of data broadcast. However, due privacy concerns, it important avoid use identifiers that may aid tracking surveillance drivers. This serious constraint on authentication mechanisms. Recently, Wang et al. [1] proposed A Two-Factor Lightweight Privacy Preserving Authentication Scheme for VANET named 2FLIP. They claim their scheme includes secure systemkey update protocol restore whole system when necessary. In this paper, we show incorrect: 2FLIP does not provide perfect forward secrecy. results known-key attack, well forgery attack by an external adversary who unregistered vehicle user. can generate valid anonymous messages further, they cannot traced. efficient, so propose modification improve security. We formal security proof our proposal indeed provably secure. demonstrate efficiency conducting extensive performance analysis. believe enhanced system-key will useful application researchers designers current future VANET schemes.