The selection of U.S. Supreme Court justices

Inferring Multi-Dimensional Ideal Points for US Supreme Court Justices

In Supreme Court parlance and the political science literature, an ideal point positions a justice in a continuous space and can be interpreted as a quantification of the justice’s policy preferences. We present an automated approach to infer such ideal points for justices of the US Supreme Court. This approach combines topic modeling over case opinions with the voting (and endorsing) behavior ...

The Retirement Strategy of Supreme Court Justices: An Economic Approach

Previous research has identified strategic behavior in the nomination, confirmation, and retirement processes of the Supreme Court, each independently. This paper analyzes the interaction between the justices, the president, and the Senate in these processes. I constructed a game theoretic model to consider the nomination and approval process of Supreme Court justices and the change in dynamics...

Concerning the Japanese Public's Evaluation of Supreme Court Justices

Retirement and death in office of U.S. Supreme Court justices.

We construct demographic models of retirement and death in office of U.S. Supreme Court justices, a group that has gained demographic notice, evaded demographic analysis, and is said to diverge from expected retirement patterns. Models build on prior multistate labor force status studies, and data permit an unusually clear distinction between voluntary and "induced" retirement. Using data on ev...

Statistical mechanics of the US Supreme Court

We build simple models for the distribution of voting patterns in a group, using the Supreme Court of the United States as an example. The least structured, or maximum entropy, model that is consistent with the observed pairwise correlations among justices’ votes is equivalent to an Ising spin glass. While all correlations (perhaps surprisingly) are positive, the effective pairwise interactions...