The service contract in Roman law

Risk Sharing, Diversification and Moral Hazard in Roman Palestine: Evidence from Agricultural Contract Law

We investigate the economic rationale for a law pertaining to tenancy in Roman Palestine, found in a Jewish legal text. This law allows for risk-sharing (through rent reduction) between tenant and landlord when the macro-economic situation is severe (makas medina), but not if the particular rental plot has a bad harvest. We consider and critique the possibility that the restriction of risk-shar...

Fault in Contract Law

A promisor is strictly liable for breaching a contract, according to the standard account. However, a negligence-based system of contract law can be given an economic interpretation, and this Article shows that such a system is in some respects more attractive than the strict-liability system. This may explain why, as a brief discussion of cases shows, negligence ideas continue to play a role i...

A Framework and Protocols for Service Contract Agreements Based on International Contract Law

Current protocols to agree to Web/Grid service usage do not have the capability to form negotiated agreements, nor do they take into account the legal requirements of the agreement process. This article presents a framework and a domain-independent negotiation protocol for creating legally binding contracts for service usage in a distributed, asynchronous service-oriented architecture. The nego...

Roman-Dutch law in modern South African succession law

The principles Govering Remedies for Breach of Contract According to Expectation Interest In The Modern European law and Iranian law

Freedom of choosing an efficient remedy after the breach of contract, Cumulation of homogeneous remedies and the right to change the selected remedy in modern European contract law have been accepted via the approach of support of the injured party`s expectation interest‌‌‌. The consideration of these principles indicates that the remedies for breach of contract are not concerned in itself and ...