The Shapley value in the Knaster gain game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Shapley Value in the Knaster Gain Game
In Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (1946). In this paper we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the game and propose its use as a measure of the players’ attitude towards coll...
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We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to the players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus serves as an alternative justification of the value.
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We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity properties. Consequently, we obtain a new characterization of the classical Shapley value as the value of the grand coalition in each player’s ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0254-5330,1572-9338
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-017-2651-8