The Shapley value in totally convex multichoice games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Shapley value in totally convex multichoice games
-In this paper, we introduce a class of totally convex multichoice cooperative games a.nd prove that the Shapley value of such games is always in the core. @ 2000 Elsevier Science I~td. All rights reserved. K e y w o r d s M u l t i c h o i c e game, Shapley value, Total convexity, Core, Coalition. 1. I N T R O D U C T I O N Hsiao and R a g h a v a n [1] i n t roduced a class of mul t ichoice c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Mathematics Letters
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0893-9659
DOI: 10.1016/s0893-9659(99)00216-5