The Shapley value of coalitions to other coalitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Shapley value of simple cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions applied on the real voting data
The main aim of this article is to compare the results of classical Shapley value concept with results of the Shapley value extended to the cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions applied on the real data of the cooperative simple game – in this case the data from the voting in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament 20022012. One of the most intriguing tasks is to describe real system problems...
متن کاملShapley mappings and the cumulative value for n-person games with fuzzy coalitions
In this paper we prove the existence and uniqueness of a solution concept for n-person games with fuzzy coalitions, which we call the Shapley mapping. The Shapley mapping, when it exists, associates to each fuzzy coalition in the game an allocation of the coalitional worth satisfying the efficiency, the symmetry, and the null-player conditions. It determines a “cumulative value” that is the “su...
متن کاملTrust and Distrust Across Coalitions: Shapley Value Based Centrality Measures for Signed Networks (Student Abstract Version)
We propose Shapley Value based centrality measures for signed social networks. We also demonstrate that they lead to improved precision for the troll detection task.
متن کاملTrust And Distrust Across Coalitions - Shapley Value Centrality Measures For Signed Networks
Signed social networks are social networks with edges indicative of both trust and distrust. We propose novel game theoretic centrality measures for signed networks, which first generalize degree-based centrality from nodes to sets, and then compute individual node centralities using the concept of Shapley Value. We derive closed form expressions for the Shapley Value for most of these measures...
متن کاملDynamic Coalitions
Policy-making is a dynamic process in which policies can be changed in each period but continue in the absence of new legislation. We study a dynamic legislative bargaining game with an endogenous status quo where in each period a dollar is allocated with a proposal voted against the allocation in the previous period. We characterize for any initial status quo a class of simple Markov perfect e...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2662-9992
DOI: 10.1057/s41599-020-00586-9