The supercore for normal-form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The supercore for normal-form games
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in that sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoner’s dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of...
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We acknowledge support of National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar prese...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.004