The Usefulness Of Accounting Information, Economic Variables, And Corporate Governance Measures To Predict Corporate Failure

Corporate Governance, Accounting Conservatism, and Manipulation

Prior studies have portrayed accounting conservatism as a tool that enables boards to perform their monitoring duties. We develop a model that suggests that the empirical association between conservatism and governance can also run in the opposite direction —only well-governed firms with suffi cient monitoring in place can fully utilize the benefits of conservative accounting. In our setting, c...

Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the...

The Corporate Governance Role of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers

This paper examines the corporate governance role of firms’ information quality and the takeover market in disciplining management. We consider a model where the takeover market plays a disciplinary role in replacing the inefficient incumbent manager to increase firm value. Increasing the information quality improves the takeover efficiency, but more precise information also discourages the man...

survey the relationship between some corporate governance instruments and economic and financial measures of performance

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Corporate Governance and Information Security