The Weak Stable Sets for Fuzzy Cooperative Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games
In this paper cores and stable sets for games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced and their relations studied. For convex fuzzy games it turns out that all cores coincide and that the core is the unique stable set. Also relations between cores and stable sets for fuzzy clan games are discussed. MSC: 90D12; 03E72
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Modern Applied Science
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1913-1852,1913-1844
DOI: 10.5539/mas.v4n7p170