منابع مشابه
Theories of coalitional rationality
This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that ever...
متن کاملCoalitional Rationality
This paper investigates the implications of groups or coalitions of players acting in their collective interest in non-cooperative normal form games. It is assumed that players are unable to make binding agreements, and pre-play communication is neither precluded nor assumed. The main idea is that each member of a coalition will con ̄ne play to a subset of their strategies if it is in their mutu...
متن کاملPreserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of the game among groups rather than among individuals. In particular, the k-additive core proposed by ...
متن کاملModeling Agents through Bounded Rationality Theories
Effectively modeling an agent’s cognitive model is an important problem in many domains. In this paper, we explore the agents people wrote to operate within optimization problems. We claim that the overwhelming majority of these agents used strategies based on bounded rationality, even when optimal solutions could have been implemented. Particularly, we believe that many elements from Aspiratio...
متن کاملOn the Coalitional Rationality of the Shapley Value and Other Efficient Values of Cooperative TU Games
In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010