Third-party verifiable voting systems: Addressing motivation and incentives in e-voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Verifiable Voting Systems
The introduction of technology into voting systems can bring a number of benefits, such as improving accessibility, remote voting and efficient, accurate processing of votes. A voting system which uses electronic technology in any part of processing the votes, from vote capture and transfer through to vote tallying, is known as an ‘e-voting’ system. In addition to the undoubted benefits, the in...
متن کاملVerifiable Postal Voting
This proposal aims to combine the best properties of paperbased and end-to-end verifiable remote voting systems. Ballots are delivered electronically to voters, who return their votes on paper together with some cryptographic information that allows them to verify later that their votes were correctly included and counted. We emphasise the ease of the voter’s experience, which is not much harde...
متن کاملPaperless Independently-Verifiable Voting
We present a new model for polling-booth voting: the voter enters the polling booth with a computational assistant which helps her verify that her vote is correctly recorded. The assistant interacts with the voting system while the voter votes on the machine in the polling booth. We present an independentlyverifiable, coercion-resistant protocol based on this model. Unlike all other independent...
متن کاملE-Voting and Biometric Systems
As e-Voting gains more importance while practicable solutions are being implemented, more questions arise concerning alternative possibilities for a secure and feasible authentication. The specific peculiarities of secure authentication to a system are various and for a sensitive area like e-Voting also challenging. In this paper we evaluate biometric systems in order to prove their capabilitie...
متن کاملVoting blocs, party discipline and party formation
I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Information Security and Applications
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2214-2126
DOI: 10.1016/j.jisa.2017.11.005