THRESHOLD VOTING IS FUNDAMENTALLY SIMPLER THAN PLURALITY VOTING
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Threshold Voting Is Fundamentally Simpler than Plurality Voting
We show that n-way plurality voting on a large wlOrdered object space has time and space complexities of B(n2) and B(n), respectively. If the object space is ordered, then sorting can be used to reduce the time complexity to the optimal B(nlogn). We then prove that weighted t-out-of-Ev; threshold voting on such an object space has time complexity O(np) and needs working storage space for only p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety Engineering
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0218-5393,1793-6446
DOI: 10.1142/s021853939400009x