Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics
where K is the set of pure strategies, ∆ = ∆(K) is the set of mixed strategies (the simplex on K), e is the k unit vector in ∆, xt ∈ ∆ is the composition of the population at time t with x k t denoting the frequency of strategy k. It was introduced by Taylor and Jonker [25] as the basic selection dynamics for the evolutionary games of Maynard Smith [20], see Hofbauer and Sigmund [16] for a summ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1080.0359