Time-Consistent Majority Rules and Heterogenous Preferences in Group Decision-Making
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Time-Consistent Majority Rules and Heterogenous Preferences in Group Decision-Making
This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to commit to the rule before votes are cast. Characteriz...
متن کاملTime-Consistent Majority Rules with Interdependent Preferences
This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a project of unknown value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to commit to the rule before votes are cast. Characterizing the...
متن کاملTime-Consistent Majority Rules with Interdependent Valuations
This paper studies collective decision-making with interdependent valuations, where, unlike the extant literature, the committee cannot commit to a majority rule, necessitating it to be ex post optimal or “time-consistent”. We find that (1) a majority rule is timeconsistent if and only if the expected number of affirmative votes it generates is approximately the rule itself; (2) the preference ...
متن کاملPreferences and Consistency Issues in Group Decision Making
1 Centre for Computational Intelligence School of Computing, De Montfort University Leicester LE1 9BH, UK [email protected] 2 Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence University of Granada, 18071 Granada, Spain [email protected] [email protected] 3 Dipartimento di Informatica e Studi Aziendali Università degli Studi di Trento Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento, Italy mp@economi...
متن کاملEndogenous Majority Rules with Changing Preferences
This paper provides a new explanation why several US states have implemented supermajority requirements for tax increases.We model a dynamic and stochastic OLG economy where individual preferences depend on age and change over time in a systematic way. In this setting, we show that the first population of voters will choose a supermajority rule in order to influence the outcomes of future elect...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1691725