Time is on my side: relational contracts and aggregate welfare
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Toward embodied artificial cognition: TIME is on my side
Michail Maniadakis*, Marc Wittmann, Sylvie Droit-Volet and Yoonsuck Choe 1 Foundation for Research and Technology Hellas, Heraklion, Greece 2 Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, Freiburg, Germany 3 Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive, CNRS (UMR 6024), Department of Psychology, Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, France 4 Department of Computer Scien...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpy044