Time, Self-Selection and User Charges for Public Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: FinanzArchiv
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0015-2218
DOI: 10.1628/0015221012904968