To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, ...rms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a ...rm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the other ...rm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a ...rm can observe the other ...rm’s pe...

TO COMMIT or NOT TO COMMIT ?

To Commit or Not to Commit: Revisiting Quantity vs. Price Competition in a Differentiated Industry

Professors Nasser and Turcic designed a model using game theory to analyze different types of firms, their supply chain options, and the choices they make when it comes to controlling output. Firms fall into one of three categories based on product differentiation in their industry: low, intermediate, or high product differentiation. Findings show that competing firms in an industry with low pr...

To Commit or Not to Commit: Modeling Agent Conversations for Action

Conversations are sequences of messages exchanged among interacting agents. For conversations to be meaningful, agents ought to follow commonly known specifications limiting the types of messages that can be exchanged at any point in the conversation. These specifications are usually implemented using conversation policies (which are rules of inference) or conversation protocols (which are pred...

Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence

In this paper we experimentally investigate Cournot duopolies with an extended timing game. The timing game has observable delay, that is, firms announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence. Theory predicts simultaneous production in the first period. With random matching we find that, given the actual experimental behavior in the subgame...