Tournaments With Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the ...
متن کاملThe optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents∗
Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best-performing employees, e.g., through promotion or bonuses, and/or to punish the worst-performing employees, e.g., through firing or unfavorable job assignments. We explore the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes. We show that while multiple prize allocati...
متن کاملSimultaneous Search with Heterogeneous Firms and Ex Post Competition
We study a search model where workers can send multiple applications to high and low productivity firms. Firms that compete for the same candidate can increase their wage offers as often as they like. We show that there is a unique equilibrium where workers mix between sending both applications to the high and both to the low productivity sector. Efficiency requires however that they apply to b...
متن کاملPricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information
This paper studies the role of exchange policies as a price discrimination device in a sequential screening model with heterogeneous goods. In the rst period, agents are uncertain about their ordinal preferences over a set of horizontally di erentiated goods, but have private information about their intensity of preferences. In the second period, each individual privately learns his preferences...
متن کاملThe Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments
We investigate the e¤ect of employee heterogeneity on the incentive to put forth e¤ort in a market-based tournament. Employers use the tournaments outcome to estimate employees abilities and accordingly condition their wage o¤ers. Employees put forth e¤ort, because by doing so they increase the probability of outperforming the rival, thereby increasing their ability assessment and thus the wa...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1026073