Toward a Mechanistic Account of Extended Cognition

Toward a Rational and Mechanistic Account of Mental Effort.

In spite of its familiar phenomenology, the mechanistic basis for mental effort remains poorly understood. Although most researchers agree that mental effort is aversive and stems from limitations in our capacity to exercise cognitive control, it is unclear what gives rise to those limitations and why they result in an experience of control as costly. The presence of these control costs also ra...

Toward a Distributed Computation Model of Extended Cognition

A mechanistic account of striatal dopamine function in human cognition: psychopharmacological studies with cabergoline and haloperidol.

The authors test a neurocomputational model of dopamine function in cognition by administering to healthy participants low doses of D2 agents cabergoline and haloperidol. The model suggests that DA dynamically modulates the balance of Go and No-Go basal ganglia pathways during cognitive learning and performance. Cabergoline impaired, while haloperidol enhanced, Go learning from positive reinfor...

A Mechanistic Account of Wide Computationalism

The assumption that psychological states and processes are computational in character pervades much of cognitive science, what many call the computational theory of mind. In addition to occupying a central place in cognitive science, the computational theory of mind has also had a second life supporting "individualism", the view that psychological states should be taxonomized so as to supervene...

A Pragmatic-Ontic Account of Mechanistic Explanation

Craver‟s (2007) account of explanation in neurobiology offers one of the most sophisticated explications of the mechanism concept. This paper argues that despite groundbreaking advances in understanding mechanistic explanation, serious challenges remain. The first goal of this paper is to address the notorious problem of explanatory relevance concerning mechanistic explanation. I argue that Cra...