Toward a Normative Model of Meaningful Human Control over Weapons Systems

Abstract The notion of meaningful human control (MHC) has gathered overwhelming consensus and interest in the autonomous weapons systems (AWS) debate. By shifting focus this debate to MHC, one sidesteps recalcitrant definitional issues about autonomy profitably moves normative discussion forward. Some delegations participating discussions at Group Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems meetings endorsed MHC with proviso that size does not fit all uses thereof. Building broad suggestion, we propose a “differentiated” — but also “principled” “prudential” framework for over systems. need differentiated approach—namely, an approach acknowledging extent normatively required depends kind used contexts their use—is supported by highlighting major drawbacks proposed uniform solutions. Within wide space profiles, distinctive ethical legal reasons are offered principled solutions invariably assign humans following roles: (1) “fail-safe actor,” contributing preventing weapon's action from resulting indiscriminate attacks breach international humanitarian law; (2) “accountability attractor,” securing conditions criminal law (ICL) responsibility ascriptions; (3) “moral agency enactor,” ensuring decisions affecting life, physical integrity, property people involved armed conflicts be exclusively taken moral agents, thereby alleviating dignity concerns associated performance targeting decisions. And prudential character our is expressed means rule, imposing default more stringent levels targeting. rule motivated epistemic uncertainties behaviors AWS. Designated exceptions admitted only agreement among states, which expresses shared conviction lower suffice preserve fail-safe actor, accountability attractor, enactor requirements those explicitly listed exceptions. Finally, maintain affords appropriate basis both national arms review policies binding regulations