Tower instrumentation without hazard

Dynamic moral hazard without commitment

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the principal. The absence of commitment is reflected both in the solution concept (perfect Bayesian equili...

Hazard Division 1.2 Tests--instrumentation Results and Interpretation

To date, nearly all efforts in the field of accidental explosion consequence determination have been aimed at the quantification of the effects of a Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 event. Little attention has been paid to the consequences of the ignition of stacks of Hazard Division 1.2 ammunition. In 1989, NATO AC/258 (Group of Experts on the Safety Aspects of Transportation and Storage of Military A...

Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments

Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken by the players. The set of interdependent-choice equilibria is a nonempty, closed and convex polytope. It characterizes all the outcomes that can be implemented in single shot interactions without repetition, side...

The automorphism tower of a centerless group without Choice

The Automorphism Tower of a Centerless Group (mostly) without Choice

For a centerless group G, we can define its automorphism tower. We define G: G = G, G = Aut (G) and for limit ordinals G = ⋃ α<δ G. Let τG be the ordinal when the sequence stabilizes. Thomas’ celebrated theorem says τG < ( 2 + and more. If we consider Thomas’ proof too set theoretical, we have here a shorter proof with little set theory. However, set theoretically we get a parallel theorem with...