Trade agreements, bargaining and economic growth
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Economic Impact of Regional Trade Agreements and Economic Co-operation: Econometric Evidence
The paper focuses on regional trade agreements and economic co-operation and develops a new appropriate approach to study their impact on growth and trade. The approach is based on an endogenous trade-growth theory and novelly specified in an economic integration (expenditure) framework which is the conceptual foundation of regional trade agreements. Importantly, it also appropriately takes int...
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The aim of this section is to: (a) clarify what justifies the inclusion of contingency measures in trade agreements; (b) provide an account of all circumstances when a suspension of commitments may make economic sense; and (c) identify the f lexibility measures built into WTO agreements. The section provides a framework for the discussion of specific contingency measures in the subsequent secti...
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According to traditional trade theories, foreign trade affects economic growth via several channels such as knowledge and technology spillover, improvement of resources allocation, increasing productivity and competitiveness. Within the framework of new trade theories, the effect of foreign trade on economic growth is ambiguous, and this effect depends on the combination of the different effect...
متن کاملA political-economic analysis of free-trade agreements: Comment
By Xuepeng Liu Abstract: In his paper in the American Economic Review, Levy (1997) develops a political economy model of free-trade agreements (FTAs). He emphasizes that the homotheticity restriction of the production function assumed for the differentiated product is crucial for his model. This comment shows that this homotheticity assumption is unnecessary and actually problematic. It is prob...
متن کاملRobustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Macroeconomics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0164-0704
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.06.004