Trade and imperfect competition in general equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imperfect competition, general equilibrium and unemployment
We analyze whether different learning abilities of firms with respect to general equilibrium effects lead to different levels of unemployment. We consider a general equilibrium model where firms in one sector compete à la Cournot and a real wage rigidity leads to unemployment. If firms consider only partial equilibrium effects when choosing quantities, the observation of general equilibrium fee...
متن کاملGeneral Equilibrium Theory with Imperfect Competition
This survey is organized as follows. l. lntroduction. Il. The main issues. IIl. Negishi's model. IV. Objective demand in the Cournot-Nash framework. V. Objective demand in the Bertrand-Nash framework. VI. The assumption of quasi-concavity of the profit functions. VII. Compromises between the conjectural and the objective approach. VIIL Insights into the notion of perfect competition. IX. Conclu...
متن کاملGeneral Equilibrium Theories of Imperfect Competition
In a pure exchange economy, the authors propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition, the ‘Cournotian monopolistic competition equilibrium,’ and compare it to the Cournot-Walras and the monopolistic competition concepts. The advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents. The comparison is made first through a simple example, then...
متن کاملThe Subjective Approach to General Equilibrium under Imperfect Competition
I would like to thank Guido Cazzavillan and Giulio Codognato for their helpful comments and suggestions. The major developments in general equilibrium under imperfect competition have been elaborated within an "objective" approach, namely the cournotian tradition, pioneered by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). Only a few contributions have been proposed within the "subjective" approach, initiated by ...
متن کاملTrade Disclosure and Imperfect Competition among Insiders
We analyze how public disclosure of insiders' trades a ects competition among informed insiders in a dynamic Kyle model. Under disclosure requirement, an insider's order ow consists of two components: an information-based component for a pro t and a random component for hiding information. We show that insiders trade more aggressively on their private information and the random components from ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.05.004