Traits, beliefs and dispositions in a pluralistic folk psychology
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
It's in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology
I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait...
متن کامل‘Folk psychology’ is not folk psychology
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between th...
متن کاملFolk Psychology
For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we wil...
متن کاملA Study of Myths in Folk Beliefs West of Hormozgan
Popular culture has a close and inevitable relationship with myths, and with a little thought, can be seen The role of mythology in the legends and folk culture of different nations. and for this reason, to understand why and what is happening between myths and people's beliefs, they must be measured by ancient beliefs and mythological rituals, to achieve the best possible result. Folk belief...
متن کاملFolk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness
In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even t...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02412-5