Transfer pricing auditing and tax forestalling by Multinational Corporations: A game theoretic approach

The problem of revenue leakages through transfer pricing remains unabated, and an examination possible causes is a continuum. This study provides nuanced the interaction between MNCs tax consultants (TCs) which treated with mixed views in existing literature. role TCs aiding abetting taxpayers into abusive (TP) has implications for policy especially situations where administration systems are porous. Based on theoretical review (deductive theorising) moves from exploring broad general aspects game theory to applying them forestalling TP by Multinational Corporations (MNCs). critiques assumptions explores influence decision making processes MNCs. It gives explanation (interpretive phenomenology) attempting promote deeper understanding contributes knowledge confluence three TP-related have been isolation findings show that tacit collusion sanitise activities minimising chances shenanigans being recognised authority due information asymmetry. Further, mediating polarised benefits who will share spoils at expense authority.