Transforming Public Procurement Contracts Into Smart Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public Sector Procurement: Lump-Sum Payments or Optimal Contracts?
In a dynamic setting, we compare procurement schemes in the form of a lump-sum payment with an optimal information-revealing menu of contracts without commitment. We nd that lump-sum contracts generate two bene ts. First, they always provide optimal levels of e ort. Second, they `tie the hands' of the procurer, and avoid the ratchet e ect. These bene ts must be weighed against the costs of high...
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Article history: Laffont and Tirole's [Laffon Received 31 July 2007 Received in revised form 28 December 2007 Accepted 8 April 2008 Available online 20 April 2008 JEL classification: D82 L14
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Information Technology Project Management
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1938-0232,1938-0240
DOI: 10.4018/ijitpm.2019040103