Transitional dynamics in network game with heterogeneous agents: stochastic case
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2074-9872
DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2021_1_33