Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy With Unobservable Goals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credibility and Monetary Policy
According to my dictionaries, "credibility" is the property of being credible, with the latter meaning roughly the same as believable. So with this definition, a policy lacks credibility if it is one that could not reasonably be believed. It would appear that William Fellner (1976, 1979), who introduced the idea into the macroeconomic arena, chose this particular word because he believed that t...
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The paper concentrates on the conditions, contingencies and determinants of central bank transparency and communication. From the state of the economy and the quality of national institutions, to the structure of monetary policy committees, the personality of the governor and the nature of the monetary policy framework - with a particular focus on the case of inflation targeting, there i...
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We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary ...
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In an effort to better anchor private-sector expectations and stabilize the economy, central banks are increasingly employing announcements about future policy. Although policy announcements can be a useful policy lever, concerns about credibility and about model uncertainty have the potential to undermine their usefulness. This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct...
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The credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the Central Bank’s conservatism. We show that another trait of the Central Bank (CB), her competence at doing her job, or reputation thereof, can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent. Like conservatism, competence enhances the CB’s ability to successfully explain her intentions to th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0020-6598,1468-2354
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00114