Trial Incentives in Sequential Litigation

A Note on Presumptions with Sequential Litigation

This note extends the Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999) model of presumptions to study situations where litigation efforts are spent sequentially rather than simultaneously. The equilibria of the litigation stage are presented as functions of b. Two characteristics distinguish this case from the simultaneous one. First, sequentiality allows the principal to pre-commit to a litigation strategy, an...

Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid

Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Confidential Settlements: Lessons from Bayer's Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy

Settlement agreements that require a plaintiff not to disclose or publicize any information about her claim are both common and controversial. Under some conditions, however, a mass tort defendant will rationally choose to discourage such secrecy. A defendant can use publicity to act as a commitment device akin to a most-favored-nation agreement to increase its bargaining power with plaintiffs....

Licensing vs. Litigation: Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate

With uncertain scope of patent protection and incomplete enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system effects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter infringement. The legal regime that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D eff...

Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability: An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation

Congress may soon restrict join t and several l iabi l i ty for c leanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settle­ ments and is therefore l ikely to increase the program ' s already high litigation costs per site. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several l iab i l i ty may either encourage or discourag...