Truth Monism Without Teleology

Truth-Making without Truth-Makers

The article is primarily concerned with the notion of a truth-maker. An explication for this notion is offered, which relates it to other notions of making something such-andsuch. In particular, it is shown that the notion of a truth-maker is a close relative of a concept employed by van Inwagen in the formulation of his Consequence Argument. This circumstance helps understanding the general me...

Teleology

Warrant without truth?

This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely pl...

Truth without satisfaction

In his famous paper [7], Tarski gave a definition of truth for a formalized language. Unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself, he gave a definition in terms of satisfaction. This makes it natural to ask if such an indirect procedure is necessary or whether a definition of truth can be given without using or somehow invoking the concept of satisfaction. The question, as it sta...

Truth Without Detachment

These lectures are based (closely) on a current (in-progress) book project. The general topic concerns truth, paradox, and logic. My aim is to motivate, advance and a defend a new approach within the family of paraconsistent approaches to transparent truth. Specifically, I aim to motivate a ‘detachment-free’ view. In short: we enjoy a transparent truth predicate in a language free of any ‘detac...