Truthful Online Double Auctions for Mobile Crowdsourcing: An On-Demand Service Strategy

نویسندگان

چکیده

Double auctions play a pivotal role in stimulating active participation of large number users comprising both task requesters and workers mobile crowdsourcing. However, most existing studies have concentrated on designing offline two-sided auction mechanisms supporting single-type tasks fixed service models. Such works ignore the need dynamic services are unsuitable for large-scale crowdsourcing markets with extremely diverse demands (i.e., types urgency degrees required by different requesters) supplies skills online durations workers). In this article, we consider practical application an on-demand strategy. Especially, innovatively design three models, namely, single-bid single-task (OSS), multiple-task (OSM), multiple-bid (OMM) models to accommodate diversified bidding users. Furthermore, effectively allocate facilitate bidding, propose truthful double mechanism each model based McAfee auction. By doing so, user can flexibly select corresponding according their current interested duration. To illustrate this, present three-demand example explain effectiveness our strategy realistic applications. Moreover, theoretically prove that satisfy truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balance, consumer sovereignty. Through extensive simulations, show various improve social utility, including platform utility average utility.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Internet of Things Journal

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['2372-2541', '2327-4662']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2022.3151924