Truthfulness in Interpretation Gadamer‘s Account
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: مجلة الآداب والعلوم الإنسانیة
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1110-4341
DOI: 10.21608/fjhj.2003.132928