Tullock contests reward information advantages
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ 2)hascountablyinfinitelymanymasspoints.Allprobabilityweightisconcentratedonthosemasspoints, whichhavethezerobidastheirsolepointofaccumulation.Withcontestantsrandomizingoveranon− convexset, thereisacostofbeinghalfhearted, whichisabsentfromboththelotterycontestandtheall−payaucti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017