Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Capital Accumulation Games of Infinite Duration
Consider a market in which firms accumulate capital according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation equation. Each player chooses a path of investment and thus an induced path of capital to maximize his total discounted profits which depend on his own capital and the capital stocks of his rivals. Existence is proved for such a nonzero sum, infinite horizon differential game and conditions u...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1986
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3