Two examples of equilibria under price rigidities and quantity rationing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Administrative rationing and multiple equilibria
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متن کاملadministrative rationing and multiple equilibria
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie
سال: 1977
ISSN: 0044-3158
DOI: 10.1007/bf01286174