Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions

A view of prominence in the philosophy emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit content have from their cognitive bases. One implication emotions, whose contents differ terms modal and temporal properties relevant particular object—because on which based these respects—nonetheless need qua emotion-type. This leads to same-emotional attitude, different claim: It possible same attitude toward a range (different) contents, as provided by paper argues this claim mistaken. By appealing specific case imagination, emotional-attitude, challenged. Drawing phenomenological observations made Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue we should recognize distinct class types, call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast bases sense-perceptual (affective perceptions). The turns way across cases modify attitudinal character experience, motivating positing two irreducible classes