"Un-Hatching" Federal Employee Political Endorsements

Manipulation through political endorsements

We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We rst show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the prefere...

The Persuasion Effects of Political Endorsements

Political evolution of federal health care regulation.

Although federal regulation of health care faces cultural obstacles and skepticism among policymakers, it has grown markedly over the past two decades. Beginning in the 1970s with decentralized programs aimed at regulating provider behavior (Health Systems Agencies and certificate of need) and budgets (state rate setting), health care regulation grew more centralized in the 1980s as federal pol...

Political Structure as Determinant of Federal Spending

This article seeks to analyze the allocation of federal government discretionary spending among Brazil’s states. In Brazil, the bulk of federal public budget must be compulsorily executed. Personnel expenditures and social taxes, social security benefits and a series of constitutionally mandatory transfers to states and municipalities are examples of expenditures over which the government has n...

The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program: A Critique