UNAIDS rejects claims of exaggeration and bias
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Effects of injury severity and cognitive exaggeration on olfactory deficits in head injury compensation claims.
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between exaggeration and scores on a test of olfactory discrimination in patients being assessed in connection with a claim for financial benefits. Participants were 448 patients referred to a private practice in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada for psychological or neuropsychological assessment, related to evaluation of impairment and disabili...
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Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration
Sell-side analysts are compensated, at least in part, by brokerage commissions. These commissions create an incentive to bias forecasts to generate trade. Thus, analysts have clear economic incentives to deceive and traders have economic incentives to detect deception. Prior analytical theories of information transmission games starkly predict that there will always be some deception (with trad...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/448251c