Unemployment Equilibrium with Myopic Complete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Unemployment
A search-theoretic model of equilibrium unemployment is constructed and shown to be consistent with the key regularities of the labor market and business cycle. The two distinguishing features of the model are: (i) the decision to accept or reject jobs is modeled explicitly, and (ii) markets are incomplete. The model is well suited to address a number of interesting policy questions. Two such a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1979
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2297056