Unitary Owen Points in Cooperative Lot-Sizing Models with Backlogging

This paper analyzes cost sharing in uncapacitated lot-sizing models with backlogging and heterogeneous costs. It is assumed that several firms participate a consortium aiming at satisfying their demand over the planning horizon minimal operating cost. Each individual firm has its own ordering channel holding technology, but cooperation other consists information. Therefore, cooperate can use best channels technology among members of consortium. mode stable. allocations overall exist, so no group agents benefit from leaving Our contribution current to present new family good properties for enforcing cooperation: unitary Owen points. Necessary sufficient conditions are provided points belong core cooperative game. In addition, we provide empirical evidence, through simulation, showing that, randomly-generated situations, above condition fulfilled 99% cases. Additionally, relationship between games certain production-inventory games, Owen’s latter, described. interesting enables easily constructing variety coalitionally stable models.