Unobservable Investments, Trade Efficiency and Search Frictions

نویسندگان

چکیده

Market participants can invest to increase their gains from trade before searching for partners. The entrants' type distribution and efficiency are jointly determined correlated. This paper explores a random search model of ex ante investments efficiency, assuming that the investment amount remains investor's private information. We show payoffs equivalent equilibrium when observable. In unique steady state equilibrium, non-degenerate price emerge simultaneously with ex-ante identical agents. basic model, where investing agents have no bargaining power, extra fail improve social welfare even friction vanishes become efficient due mismatches caused by unobservability. Allocating positive power investors alleviates mismatch problem improves welfare.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1556-5068']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3839322