Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bounds in Auctions with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Many empirical studies of auctions rely on the assumption that the researcher observes all variables that make auctions differ ex ante. When there is unobserved heterogeneity, the direction of the bias this causes is known only in a few restrictive examples. In this paper, I show that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in a first price sealed bid auction with symmetric independent private values...
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Asymptotic and bootstrap tests are studied for testing whether there is a relation of stochastic dominance between two distributions. These tests have a null hypothesis of nondominance, with the advantage that, if this null is rejected, then all that is left is dominance. This also leads us to define and focus on restricted stochastic dominance, the only empirically useful form of dominance rel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Econometrics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0304-4076
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.07.009