Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Identity, Cooperation, and Punishment
Among economists, there is increased recognition of the role individuals’ identities play in decision-making. In this paper, we conduct laboratory experiments in which we explore the motivations for and the effects of group identity. We find that negative out-group opinion (acting as an inter-group identity threat) can motivate in-group/out-group effects in a simple bargaining context. Further,...
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Casual evidence as well as daily experience suggest that many people have a strong aversion against being the "sucker" in social dilemma situations. As a consequence, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding, even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities. A main purpose of this paper is to show experimentally that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007