Using Approximate Circuits Against Hardware Trojans
نویسندگان
چکیده
Editor’s notes: Approximate computing is almost always associated with results showing a tradeoff between accuracy and computational efficiency. In this article, however, approximate finds application in hardware trustworthiness encouraging results. —Mario Barbareschi, University of Naples Federico II
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE design & test
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2168-2364', '2168-2356']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/mdat.2021.3117741