Variance analysis and linear contracts in agencies with distorted performance measures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Accounting Research
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1044-5005
DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2008.12.002