Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming

Planning Attacks to Security Protocols: Case Studies in Logic Programming

Formal verification of security protocols has become a key issue in computer security. Yet, it has proven to be a hard task often error prone and discouraging for non-experts in formal methods. In this paper we show how security protocols can be specified and verified efficiently and effectively by embedding reasoning about actions into a logic programming language. In a nutshell, we view a pro...

TAuth: Verifying Timed Security Protocols

Quantitative timing is often relevant to the security of systems, like web applications, cyber-physical systems, etc. Verifying timed security protocols is however challenging as both arbitrary attacking behaviors and quantitative timing may lead to undecidability. In this work, we develop a service framework to support intuitive modeling of the timed protocol, as well as automatic verification...

Compiling and Verifying Security Protocols

Verifying Parameterized Timed Security Protocols

Quantitative timing is often explicitly used in systems for better security, e.g., the credentials for automatic website logon often has limited lifetime. Verifying timing relevant security protocols in these systems is very challenging as timing adds another dimension of complexity compared with the untimed protocol verification. In our previous work, we proposed an approach to check the corre...

Planning as tabled logic programming

This paper describes Picat’s planner, its implementation, and planning models for several domains used in International Planning Competition (IPC) 2014. Picat’s planner is implemented by use of tabling. During search, every state encountered is tabled, and tabled states are used to effectively perform resource-bounded search. In Picat, structured data can be used to avoid enumerating all possib...