Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How buybacks eliminate opportunism in vertical contracting
A monopolist producer, o¤ering private contracts to competing retailers, may be unable to exercise its monopoly power because of the scope for opportunistic behavior. In this paper we show that the producer eliminates this problem using bilateral contracts with buybacks, together with a price ceiling if needed (buybacks are a price paid by the producer to the retailer for each unit of unsold st...
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W e consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue-sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retai...
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Large firms often negotiate the terms of trade with their input suppliers. When they do so, an ex-ante agreement to share information about parameters should make it more likely that they will be able to reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade. However, if the firm refuses to share information, the supplier may shade down its price offer in order to increase the probability that it ...
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When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces playersstrategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principalsincentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities and the corr...
متن کاملTrust, Opportunism and Governance a Process and Control Model
The article develops a process and control model for the analysis and design of inter-firm relations, in which both opportunism and trust play a role. Its aim is to develop a tool which helps to analyze combinations, balances and imbalances of trust and opportunism, formal and informal forms of governance, and viable sequences of strategies of governance, depending on different conditions. It e...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114