Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Cannibalization or Proliferation?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Differentiation With Shared Features And Cannibalization Of Information Goods
Large sunk cost of development, negligible cost of reproduction and distribution and substantial economies of scale make information goods distinct from industry goods. In this paper, we analyze versioning strategies of horizontally differentiated information goods with shared feature sets, discrete hierarchical groups and continuous individual consumer tastes. Based on our modelling results, w...
متن کاملDynamic downstream collusion with secret vertical contracts
We consider dynamic, infinitely repeated downstream price competition. In every period, a retailer cannot observe the contract that the competing retailer offers to a joint supplier. We find that even though contracts are secret, they enable retailers to collude. The more the retailers and the supplier care about future profits, retailers obtain a higher share of the monopoly profits. We also f...
متن کاملDo Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?∗
In this paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers faciliate collusion through the operation of a foreclosure effect: Cheating unintegrated firms can no longer prof...
متن کاملProduct differentiation, price discrimination and collusion
The existing literaturewhich analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discr...
متن کاملVertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion
This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustai...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2744525