Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

Competitive prices of homogeneous goods in multilateral markets

We introduce a subclass of multi-sided assignment games that embodies markets with different types of firms that produce different types of homogeneous goods. These markets generalize bilateral Böhm-Bawerk horse markets. We describe the geometric and algebraic structure of the core, which is always nonempty. We also characterize the extreme points of the core and show that they are marginal wor...

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core and competitive prices∗

A class of three-sided assignment markets is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together ...

Dynamic Multilateral Markets Proof of Theorem 1

Testing Neoclassical Competitive Theory in Multilateral Decentralized Markets

Walrasian tâtonnement has been a fundamental assumption in economics ever since Walras’ general equilibrium theory was introduced in 1874. Nearly a century after its introduction, Vernon Smith relaxed the Walrasian tâtonnement assumption by showing that neoclassical competitive market theory explains the equilibrating forces in “double-auction” markets. I make a next step in this evolution by e...

Collusion in Markets with Syndication∗

Markets for IPOs and debt issuances are syndicated, in the sense that a bidder who wins a contract may invite losing bidders to join a syndicate that together fulfills the contract. We show that in markets with syndication, standard intuitions from industrial organization can be reversed: Collusion may become easier as market concentration falls, and market entry may in fact facilitate collusio...