Vincent Debanne : No Exaggeration

Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration

Sell-side analysts are compensated, at least in part, by brokerage commissions. These commissions create an incentive to bias forecasts to generate trade. Thus, analysts have clear economic incentives to deceive and traders have economic incentives to detect deception. Prior analytical theories of information transmission games starkly predict that there will always be some deception (with trad...

Vincent Walsh

Vincent Walsh is Professor of Human Brain Research at University College London. He was a Royal Society University Research Fellow for 10 years and now leads the Visual Cognition Group in the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (ICN). His interests span visual perception, learning, time, space and number processing and synaesthesia. He engages widely in public communication projects and is a re...

Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games

We study an information aggregation game in which each of a finite collection of “senders” receives a private signal and submits a report to the center, who then makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The integration of three features distinguishes our framework from the related literature: players’ reports are aggregated by a mechanistic averaging rule, their strategy sets are...

Vincent Yeung

Vincent Laudet

writing system that we know to be a derived one. This early branching point is thus the equivalent of speciation in biological evolution. The separate writing systems of these neighbouring regions must have been mutually incomprehensible. Over a short time span — three centuries at most, but probably much less — the proto-Elamite script spread across Iran, offering a prime example of cultural d...